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The  Politics  of Targeting 1
Jonah  B. Gelbach and  Lant H. Pritchett
Abstract:  Standard  economic  analysis  suggests  that  when  the  budget  for  redistribution  is fixed,  income
transfers  should  be targeted  to (i.e.  means-tested  for) those  most  in need.  However, both  political  scientists
and  economists  long  have  recognized  the  possibility  that  targeting  might  undermine  political  support  for
redistribution.  We  formalize  this  recognition,  developing  a simple  economy  in  which  both  non-targeted
(universally  received)  and  targeted  transfers  are available  for use by the  policymaker.  We allow the  budget
to  be  determined  through  majority  voting,  while  the  policymaker  chooses  the  share  of the  budget  to  be
spent  on each  type  of transfer.  Our results  are striking.  If the  policymaker  ignores  political  feasibility  and
assumes  that  the budget  is fixed,  she will choose full targeting  of transfers  - in the process  minimizing  social
welfare  and  the  utility  of the  poor,  given  that  political  feasibility  must  hold  in equilibrium.  By  contrast,
when  the policymaker  recognizes  budgetary  endogeneity,  she will choose zero targeting,  spending  the entire
budget  on the  universally  received  transfer.  Social  welfare,  the  budget  for redistribution,  and  the utility  of
poor  agents  all are  maximized  in the  resulting  equilibrium.
IGelbach  is at M.I.T.,  Pritchett  is at  The World Bank.  This material  is based  upon work supported  under
a National  Science Foundation  Graduate  Research  Fellowship;  Gelbach  also wishes  to acknowledge  financial
support  from  The World Bank.  We would like to thank  Peter  Diamond,  Michael Kremer,  Anne  Case,  Angus
Deaton,  Martin  Ravallion,  Paul  Glewwe,  Emannuel  Jimenez,  Estelle  James,  Dominique  van de  Walle,  Jim
Poterba,  and participants  at  seminars  at  the World Bank,  M.I.T.,  and Princeton  for useful comments.  Deon
Filmer  also  gave us indispensable  help.  Any opinions,  findings,  conclusions  or  recommendations  expressed
in  this  work  are  those  of  the  authors  and  do  not  necessarily  reflect  the  views  of  the  National  Science
Foundation  or  The  World  Bank.  This  paper  is a revised  version  of World  Bank  Policy  Research  Working
Paper  #  1523. Correspondence  to Pritchett  at  The  World Bank,  PRDPH,  1818 H St.,  Wash,  DC  20433, or
IpritchettOworldbank.org.  Correspondence  to  Gelbach  at  gelbachOnber.org.1  Introduction
During  the  1995-96 debate  over the  federal budget,  the  question  of whether  to  means test
Medicare  benefits  was raised.  Representative  Charles  Rangel,  a  liberal  Democrat  who
represents  Harlem,  argued  against  doing so, apparently  defending  the  view  that  the  rich
should  continue  to  receive  exactly  the  same  benefits  as  the  poor.  Speaker  of the  House
Newt  Gingrich,  a  conversative  Republican,  argued  for targeting  benefits,  so that  the  rich
would receive  less generous  benefits  than  the  poor.  At  first glance,  such a situation  seems
a curious  political  inversion:  one politician  who regards  himself as the defender  of his poor
constituents  arguing  in favor of spending  on rich ones, with  another  politician  not  usually
identified  that  way arguing  against  such spending.
Moreover, such political  behavior  seems to contradict  both  common sense and  a fair bit
of economics.  Common  sense suggests that  fewer people sharing  the pie means larger slices:
means-testing,  or targeting,  means more for the  poor.  Theoretical  assessments  of targeting
generally  have  involved  normative  models  in  which  one  assumes  the  budget  for  redistri-
bution  is fixed,  while  the  structure  and  degree  of targeting  is chosen  to  maximize  social
welfare  (or minimize  poverty);  alternatively,  both  the  budget  (i.e.  degree of taxation)  and
targeting  variables  are chosen simultaneously.  While  the literature  has  considered  informa-
tional  constraints,  incentive  compatibility,  and  efficiency losses, some degree of targeting  is
always found  to  be optimal  in the  models examined.'
'For  examples  in a variety  of settings,  see  Akerlof  (1978),  Atkinson  (1995),  Besley  and  Kanbur  (1990),
Diamond  and  Sheshinski  (1995),  Kremer  (1997),  Nichols and  Zeckhauser  (1982),  Sen  (1995),  Stern  (1982),
and  Viard  (1996).
1But  what  does  an  experienced  politician  like  Rangel  know,  that  the  models  do  not
capture?  Why is it often said among policy makers that  "programs  for the poor are (budget)
poor  programs"?  As political  scientists,  politicians  and policymakers  - and  certainly  some
economists  - suspect,  the  size of the  pie is not  fixed.  If the  budget  for redistribution  is
politically  determined,  the  impact  of targeting  cannot  be determined  without  accounting
for the  effect of changes  in the  degree of targeting  on  the  size of the  budget  available  for
redistribution.  Surprisingly,  the  literature  contains  no formal  treatment  of such feedback
effects.  As the title  of this  paper  suggests,  we show that  once such effects are incorporated,
more  for the poor  might  mean  less for the  poor.
We construct  a simple model in which a policymaker  allocates the budget  for redistribu-
tive transfers  between  a targeted  and a universal  transfer  to maximize social welfare,  while
the  electorate  - composed  of three  income  groups  - votes  on  the  level of taxation.  The
essential  feature  of the  economy we consider  is that  middle  class voters  support  positive
taxation  either  because  they  face a  positive  probability  of being  unemployed  or  because
they  care about  the  utility  of the poor,  or both.
If the  policy  maker  is  "naive",  so that  she  assumes  the  budget  is fixed and  invariant
to  the  degree of targeting,  she will devote as much  as possible of the  budget  to  spending
on  the  targeted  transfer. 2 This  result  is exactly  what  the  standard  economic  approach
to  targeting  suggests.  But  when  a political  feasibility  constraint  must  be  respected,  this
2Because  of  informational  and  incentive  constraints,  there  will be  some taxes  high  enough  so that  the
policymaker  will not  spend  the  entire  budget  on the targeted  transfer.  If she did,  some agents  would  reduce
their  labor  supply,  causing  the  tax  base to  fall, so that  reducing  the  degree  of targeting  would  increase  all
agents'  utilities.  We discuss  this  point  in more  detail  below.
2approach  not  only  is not  optimal,  but  in fact  it is  exactly the  wrong thing  to  do,  leading
to  the  minimization  of social  welfare.  By  contrast,  a  "sophisticated"  policymaker  who
recognizes  the  political  feasibility  constraint  will maximize  social  welfare,  in  the  process
choosing  to  allocate  zero spending  to the targeted  transfer.
The rest  of the paper  proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce  the basic  structure
of the  model.  In Section  3, we present  our main  results.  We conclude  in Section  4.
2  The  Model
2.1  The  basic  model
We consider  a  population  having  unit  measure  and  consisting  of three  types  of agents:
low income,  middle  income  and  rich  (subscripted  by 1, m,  and  r,  respectively);  group  i's
population  share  is ai.  If employed, these  agents  have  maximum  marginal  products  equal
to  s,  1, and  r,  respectively,  where  ,u <  1 <  r.  There  are  three  types  of jobs,  each  of
which  pays  either  ,,  1, or  r.  An  agent  may  work  in  any  job  paying  no  more  than  her
maximum  marginal  product,  and  we assume  that  there  are always just  enough jobs  of each
type  to employ  all  workers in their  chosen type.  We assume that  poor  and  middle  income
agents  have  some probability  p of being  "unemployed"  (having  zero pre-transfer  income)
and  probability  q _  - p of being employed.  Rich agents are  always employed.
Workers  in jobs  paying  p  pay  no taxes;  by contrast,  jobs  paying  1 and  r  are  taxable
at  the  proportional  rate  T.  We motivate  this  assumption  by  imagining  that  there  are
tax-free  "informal"  and  taxable  "formal"  sectors  in the  economy. This  assumption  follows
Kramer  and  Snyder  (1988), who  use it  in their  analysis  of the  politics  of constant  versus
3increasing  marginal  tax  rates.  By replacing  variable  labor  disutility  with  this  assumption,
one  greatly  simplifies  the  analysis,  allowing for closed-form  results.  Introducing  constant
labor  disutility,  as in Akerlof (1978), for example,  would cause only minor differences while
changing  none of the  results  as stated  in the  main  text.
All agents  have  the  identical  von Neumann-Morgenstern  utility  function  u,  with  u'  >
0 > u".  Given that  informal  sector  income is untaxed,  middle  income and  rich agents  will
work  in formal sector jobs  only if doing so yields greater  utility,  after  including  the  effects
of differences  in transfers  available  to workers as a function  of job choice, than  choosing to
work  in  the  informal  sector.  We will assume  throughout  the  paper's  main  text  that  this
requirement  is met  strictly  for both  middle income and  rich workers.
A  1  (Formal  Sector  Work)  The  utility  function  u  and all parameters  of  the model  are
such that in any equilibrium, employed middle income and rich workers always strictly prefer
formal  sector work  to informal  sector  work, after  accounting for  all cross-sector  differences
in  taxation  and  transfers.
Dropping  this  assumption  complicates  the  analysis greatly,  but  does not systematically
change  our  substantive  findings.  In  a  companion  paper,  Gelbach  (1997)  generalizes  the
model  to  account  for endogeneity  of job  choice. 3
We define the  tax  base as V. Under  assumption  A  1 (and  because  there  is no variable
labor  disutility)  the  tax  base does not depend  on the tax  rate.  Since there  are qam- middle
income workers earning  1 unit of income each and ar rich workers earning  r, the  ta x base is
3Because  there  axe few changes  in our results,  and  because  the  generalization  requires  significantly  more
notation  and  rigor  to  carry  out,  we have choseu in this  paper  to focus  only on cases when  A 1 is satisfied.
4y = qam+aor.  By definition,  the total  budget  available to the government  for redistribution
is  yT.
Two  types  of transfers  are  feasible.  The  first,  N,  is non-targeted  and  thus  is received
universally  by  all agents.  We make  the  informational  assumption  that  the  policymaker  is
unable  to  distinguish  agents  working  in jobs  with  marginal  product  of A from agents  who
are unemployed,4 so that  the targeted  transfer  0, is received only by those agents with  zero
formal-sector  income.  Since rich  agents  are never  unemployed,  and  since assumption  A  1
guarantees  that  rich agents always work in the formal sector,  they never receive the targeted
transfer.  All poor  agents  receive the targeted  transfer,  while middle  income agents  receive
it only if they  are unemployed.  That  the targeted  transfer  0 provides  insurance  is obvious;
perhaps  this  fact is not so obvious for the universal transfer  N.  Because N  is received when
agents  are unemployed,  it also provides  insurance.
We may  define the takeup  rate  for the  targeted  transfer  0 as
5 _l  + Pm,  (1)
and  we may now write  the  government's  budget  constraint  as
N±+ 0=Tr  (2)
That  is, total  expenditures  (the LHS of the  budget  constraint)  are equal  to the  sum of
total  untargeted  expenditures,  N,  and  total  targeted  transfers,  which  in turn  are equal  to
the  product  of the  takeup  rate  5  and  the targeted  transfer  9. Total  revenues  (the  RHS of
4Again,  this  assumption  follows the  spirit  of Kramer  and  Snyder  (1988).
5the  budget  constraint)  have been  seen above to  be the  product  of the  (constant)  tax  base
y and  the  tax  rate,  T-.
Our  principal  task  in  the  model  is  to  investigate  properties  of Nash  equilibria  in  a
game  played  between  a  policymaker  and  the electorate,  where the  strategy  spaces  are the
level of  the  budget  (for the  electorate)  and  the  budget's  distribution  between  universal
and  targeted  transfers  (for  the  policymaker).  We define the  fraction  of the  budget  spent
on  targeted  transfers  as k,  so that  we may  rewrite  the  budget  constraint  ( 2) as the  two
identities:
6  kVr  (3)
N  = (1-  k)ypr  (4)
Table  1 displays  the  model's  basic components.
As an aside, it will be useful below to have notation  for the tax  level at  which employed
middle  income workers are just  indifferent between  formal  and  informal  sector  work, given
that  all  employed middle  income and  rich agents  choose the  formal  sector.  That  is, fixing
k we want to find the tax  level such that  N + H  + p  = N + 1 - r.  This level may be written
ra (k)  (5)
Thus,  assumption  A 1 requires that  in any equilibrium,  (k, r)  must  satisfy  T <ra,,(k).
Since some agents  will not receive the  targeted  transfer,  i.e.  a  < 1, the  argument  that
6targeting  can  increase  welfare  seems  well-grounded:  a  given  amount  of revenue  spent  on
targeted  transfers  allows a  greater  transfer  per recipient  than  the  same  amount  spent  on
untargeted  transfers.  Put  another  way,  OIk=I  >  Nlk=o.  Thus  the  favorable  budgetary
performance  of the  targeted  transfer  stems  from the  fact  that  it need  not  be  given to  all
agents,  as the  universal  transfer  must.  Favorable  social welfare performance  of targeting
hinges on whether  those agents  excluded from receiving  targeted  transfers  have less "need"
for them  than  those  who are  included.  Using the  integral  of agents'  utilities  as the  social
welfare function,  we show below that  full  targeting  - i.e.  spending  as much as possible  on
the  targeted  transfer  and  as little  as possible on  the  universal  one  (without  violating  the
incentive  compatibility  of formal-sector  work for middle class and rich agents)  - passes this
test  when  the  budget  does  not vary  (i.e.  when  we ignore politics).5 Targeting  makes use
of information  about  agents'  before-tax  and  -transfer  incomes, so  failing to  use targeting
generally  entails  ignoring valuable  information.
We can now write  own-utility  functions  (i.e.  utility  functions  excluding  any  altruism)
generated  by  equilibrium  job  choice behavior.  Recognizing  that  both  N  and  9 vary  with
the  degree  of targeting  k  and  the  tax  rate  T,  the  own-utility  functions  of middle  income
and  poor  agents  are
Ul(k,  r) _  pu(N  + 0) + qu(N  + 0 +  L)  (6)
5For  a  given  tax  rate,  and  hence  a  given  budget,  targeting  transfers  will  redistribute  resources  from
non-targeted  agents  to  targeted  ones.  Hence there  will always exist  some social  welfare function  for which
the  policymaker  would  choose not  to target  when  the  budget  is fixed.  As an example,  if the  social planner
cared  only  for the  rich and,  then  no targeting  would  be used  when  the  budget  is taken  as fixed..
7Um(k,  T)  = pu(N  + 0) + qu(N  +  1-r)  (7)
Hence poor agents'  utility  is a strictly  increasing transformation  of total  transfers  N + 9.
To allow altruism,  we introduce  the overall utility  function  for middle  income voters,
Vm(k,  T;am)  =  (1-  am)Um(k,rT)  +aOmUl(k,-T)
=  pu(N  + 0) + amqu(N  + 0 + p,)  + (1-am)qu(N  + 1-T)  (8)
where  cem is the  altruism  coefficient for middle  income voters:  the  greater  is am,  the  more
relative  concern  middle  income  agents  show  for  the  welfare  of poor  agents.  It  will be
convenient  to  use the  notation  VI(k,  T)  = Ul(k, i-),  as we will assume  that  poor  agents  do
not  care about  the  welfare of either  rich or middle  income agents.
Since all rich agents  work in the  formal sector,  their own-utility  is simply
U, (k,  r)  =_  u  (N + r (l  -Tr))  (9)
Hence rich agents'  own-utility  is a  strictly  increasing  transformation  of their  net  con-
sumption  N  + r(1  - T).  To allow altruism  for rich agents,  we define
Vr(k,  T ;  ,r) =  (1 -a a)Ur(k,T)  + arUl(k,Tr),  (10)
where  ar  is the  coefficient of altruism  for rich agents.
To make things  interesting,  we assume that  the function u is concave enough that  middle
income voters  always want  some positive  level of taxation.
8A  2  (Positive  Taxation)  For  any  degree of targeting,  the utility  function  u  and  the pa-
rameters  of the  model  are such  that middle  income  voters'  overall utility  is  increasing  in
the tax  rate when there is zero taxation.
A  sufficient  condition  for  this  assumption  is lim,o  u'(c)  =  oo, so that  middle  income
workers  are  always better  off buying  some positive  amount  of consumption  insurance  (for
any  finite  price).  Any  constant  relative  risk aversion  utility  function  - e.g.  log utilities  -
will satisfy  this  requirement.
2.2  Majority  voting  equilibrium
In  our  analysis  of optimal  policymaking  in  Section  3,  we  assume  that  the  policymaker
chooses  a  level of targeting,  k,  after  which  an  election  is held  to  determine  the  level  of
taxation.  Our task  in this  subsection  is therefore  to describe  the  winning tax  rate  for each
value  of k.6 Typically,  one requires  that  an  equilibrium  tax  rate  receives  support  from  a
majority  of the population.  In the present  case, we will assume that  no majority  is possible
without  support  from at  least  two types  of agents.  This  assumption  does not  restrict  the
population  shares  0i,  since it  is possible  that  a  given type  of agent  represents  more  than
half the population  but for some reason has less than  half the political power in the society.7
6One might challenge  our results  on the grounds  that  our choice of political  institution  is ad hoc. However,
we  think  that  it  reflects  the  critical  issues  quite  accurately:  policymakers  typically  have more  scope  over
the  design  and  administration  of government  programs  than  they  do over  the level of funding  (in the  U.S.,
for example,  the  President  has  much more  discretion  over program  structure  through  rules  making  than  he
does  over program  funding,  which of course  must  be approved  by Congress).
7The  assumption  is restrictive  in that  we axe choosing  to focus  only on cases when  no one type  of agent
can  implement  a tax  rate  unilaterally.  While such  a situation  could occur,  it is uninteresting  from  a political
9Hence we may  treat  the  determination  of the  tax  rate  as a three-person  voting game.
Under  assumption  A 1, all three  utility  functions  VI, Vm, and  V, are twice continuously
differentiable  and  strictly  concave  in the  degree of taxation.  This fact implies that  they  are
also single-peaked,  so that  a majority  voting equilibrium  tax rate  (i.e.  a Condorcet  winner)
always exists  and  is given by the  median-preferred  tax  rate.  Given  the  degree of targeting
k, it  will be convenient  to  define  r*  (k)  as the  value of the  tax  rate  that  solves the  middle
income  FOC,  i.e.  9Vm(k,-r*(k))/1.r  =  0.  We will need  the  following assumption,  which
ensures  that  middle  income voters'  preferred  tax  rate  is always the  Condorcet  winner:
A  3  Fix  the  degree of  targeting k.  Rich  agents  are  never  so  altruistic  that  they prefer  a
greater  tax rate than  do middle  income  agents.  That  is, aVr(k,r*(k))/O9T  < 0.
Since  WVm  (k, T* (k))/Tr  =  0 is the first order condition  for middle income voters'  optimal
tax  rate,  given  the  degree  of targeting,  &Vr(k,Tr*(k))/Tr <  0 implies  that  at  the  given
degree  of targeting,  rich voters  oppose  taxes  greater  than  r*(k),  preferring  r*(k)  instead.
By concavity, we have established  that  both  middle income and rich agents favor T*(k)  over
all greater  tax  rates  (given that  the  degree of targeting  k is fixed).
On  the  other  hand,  since  poor  voters  never  pay  taxes  but  always  receive  transfers,
they  must  favor all  tax  increases  and  oppose all  reductions,  no matter  what  the  degree of
targeting.  Therefore,  both  middle  income and  poor  agents  prefer  -r*(k) over all lower tax
rates  Therefore  T-* (k) defeats  all other  tax  rates  in any election  requiring  support  from two
or more  agent  types.  Concavity  of all utility  functions  then  implies that  (fixing the degree
economy perspective, so there is no harm in making it.
10of targeting)  no other  tax  rate  can have  this  property.  Hence r*(k)  is the  majority  voting
equilibrium  given k.
We will say  that  a  targeting-taxation  policy  (k, r)  is politically  feasible if and  only  if
T  =  r*(k).  That  is,  a  policy  is politically  feasible  if and  only  if, given  that  the  degree
of targeting  is k,  the  accompanying  tax  rate  is the  one that  would  be chosen  through  an
election  of the kind just  described.
3  Social  Welfare,  Optimal  Policy,  and  Nash  Equilibrium
We argue  in subsection  3.1 that  the optimal  policy with a fixed budget  (i.e. with no political
feasibility  constraint)  is full targeting. 8 In  subsection  3.2 we distinguish  "sophisticated"
policymaking  - recognizing  budgetary  endogeneity  - from "naive" policymaking  - failing to
recognize it.  We define naive Nash equilibria  and sophisticated  Nash equilibria  as situations
in which  (1) the  policymaker's  targeting  choice is optimal  given the  kind  of policymaking
involved  and  (2) the  tax  rate  is politically  feasible,  given that  targeting  choice.  We argue
that  a unique  naive Nash equilibrium  must exist, in which all revenues are spent on targeted
transfers  and  none  are spent  on universal  transfers.
In  subsection  3.3,  we focus  on  the  set  of politically  feasible policies,  discussing  their
welfare  properties.  In particular,  we  argue  that  on  the  set  of politically  feasible policies,
the overall utility  of both  poor and middle income agents is strictly  decreasing  in the degree
8Because  of the formal  sector work  constraint, "full  targeting"  may not mean  setting k = 1, i.e. spending
all revenues  on targeted transfers. Except  at very  low  tax rates, doing  so would  lead at least some agents
to forgo  formal  sector work. For any tax level,  we derive  the full-targeting  level  of k below.
11of targeting.  By contrast,  the opposite  is true  for the  own-utility  of rich agents.  Moreover,
we argue that  social welfare will be strictly  decreasing in the degree of targeting,  from which
it  follows that  there  is a  unique  sophisitcated  Nash  equilibrium,  in  which all revenues  are
spent  on universal  transfers  and  none are spent  on  targeted  transfers.
3.1  Defining  social  welfare
We may  write  the  social welfare function  as
S(k, T)  _=  alUI(k, T)  + o(mUm(k,T)  + clrUr(k,T),  (1)
Note that  we have defined the social welfare function  in terms of the own-utility functions
Ui.  There  is no  loss of generality  here;  we could as well define it  over the  overall  utility
functions  Vi, with  only notational  differences  arising.
Given  a  fixed budget,  we  could  demonstrate  optimality  of full  targeting  by  grinding
out  the  first  order  condition,  holding  the  tax  rate  constant.  However,  a  more  intuitive
approach  is available.  The basic result to which we appeal  is that  a policymaker  maximizing
a weighted  average of concave  utilities  will always want to  undertake  a policy  that  reduces
the  "spread"  of the after-tax  and  -transfer  income distribution.
By raising  the sum of targeted  and  universal transfers  N + 0 but  lowering the  universal
transfer  N,9 fixed-budget  increases  in targeting  redistribute  income from employed agents
(who have income of either  N+1-r,  if middle income, or N+r(l  -T),  if rich) to unemployed
ones  (who have  income  of either  N  + 0  or  N + 0 + ru).  Such  a  policy  moves population
9From the  budget  identities,  we may  write  N + H  =  [d  + (1 - S)k]y/6,  which is clearly  increasing  in k By
contrast,  N  =  (1 - k)yr  is decreasing  in k.
12density  equal to p(ul + amr)  from the initial  income level (N + O)o  to the higher income level
(N  + 0)1, while moving  the  density  qol from the  initial  income level (N  + O)o  + p  to  the
higher  income  level (N  + O)l + It.  At  the  same  time,  the increase  in targeting  reduces  the
universal  transfer  N  (since a  smaller  share  of the  fixed budget  is now  spent  on  universal
transfers),  so  that  income  for the  density  of qoam  + ao, employed  middle  income  and  rich
agents  falls  by N1 - No.  Technically  speaking,  the  income distribution  with  ko is second
order  stochastically  dominated  by  the  distribution  with  k1. Hence for any  increasing  and
concave  utility  function,  it follows that  fixed-budget  targeting  raises  social welfare.
Thus  it appears  that  fixed-budget  increases  in targeting  should  be pursued  so long  as
these  are  feasible.  However, except  at  low levels of taxation,  high  levels of targeting  will
make  the  combination  of informal  sector work and  large targeted  transfers  more  attractive
to  middle  income  or rich agents  than  formal  sector  work without  targeted  transfers.  As
such,  for any  tax  rate  T  there  generally  will exist a threshold  level of targeting  above which
not  all employed  middle  income and  rich  agents  will choose formal sector  work, violating
assumption  A 1.
To find  this  threshold  level for  middle  income  agents,  we simply  find  the  degree  of
targeting  that  makes an employed middle class agent just  indifferent  between sectors,  given
the  levels  of transfers  that  arise  when  all  agents  who  can,  choose to  work  in the  formal
sector.  That  is, we set N + 1 - =  N + 9 + ,,  where N  and  0 are as defined above (i.e. the
tax  base  and  takeup  rate  reflect the  choice of all employed middle  income and  rich agents
to  work in the formal  sector).  Rewriting,  we have  the threshold  level
13k(r)  6(1-T-i)  (12)
Hence for any T  and k > k(7r),  some positive fraction of employed  middle income agents
will choose work in the informal sector, while all of them (and all rich agents) choose formal
sector work for any k < max[k(7-),  1). Thus k(r)  is the highest degree of targeting, given
the tax rate, for which all employed middle income and rich agents work in formal sector
jobs.  We refer to this degree of targeting as "full" targeting.10' 11
To sum up this subsection, the value of k that  maximizes social welfare for any fixed
degree of taxation  is either  1 or the greatest value of k such that  all rich and employed
middle income workers choose to  work in the  formal sector.  This result  accords with
economic intuition - that information should be used - and shows  that we have not stacked
the deck against targeting.
l°Note  that  full targeting  entails  setting  k =  1 for any tax  no greater  than  6(1 -p)/(p  +  &).  This  quantity
is clearly  positive,  so  that  there  will  exist  taxes  low  enough  such  that  full  targeting  always  entails  zero
universal  transfers,  i.e.  spending  the  whole  budget  on the  targeted  transfer  0.
"Gelbach  (1997)  shows  that  when  k is increased  a small  amount  above  k(T), the  tax  base  falls and  the
takeup  rate  rises quickly  enough  to more than  offset the beneficial  distributional  impact  of raising  the  degree
of targeting.  That  is, there  is a region on which increases  in targeting  cause  employed  middle  income  agents
to  switch  continuously  from  the  formal  to  the  informal  sector.  Once  all have  switched,  we again  have  a
constant  tax  base  and takeup  rate,  so that  increases  in targeting  are locally  improving.  When  the degree  of
targeting  becomes  great  enough  that  rich voters  are just  indifferent  between  sectors,  all further  increases  in
k end  up lowering  social welfare.  Hence either  the  degree of targeting  k or the  value of k leaving  rich voters
indifferent  between  sectors  must  be  optimal  when  the  budget  is fixed.
143.2  Nash  equilibrium  with  naive  and  sophisticated  policymaking
The naive policymaker does not recognize budgetary endogeneity. Instead, she takes the
tax rate  as fixed and then seeks to  maximize social welfare over the degree of targeting.
Since there is no guarantee that,  given an arbitrary  tax rate  T,  the maximizing choice of
k  will satisfy political feasibility, we must incorporate this requirement explicitly into the
definition of naive Nash equilibrium (NNE). Hence an NNE is any policy (k*, r*) jointly
satisfying the requirements
k  = arg max S(k, T)
kE[0,1]
T  =  T*(k*)  (13)
We know from the previous subsection that  full targeting is always optimal given a
fixed  tax  rate.  Now, under  assumption  A  1, we have  r*(k)  <  ra (k)  in  any  equilibrium.
Thus no politically feasible policy (k, r*(k)) can entail full targeting unless k =  1, i.e. all
revenues are spent on the targeted transfer.  That  is, for any politically feasible tax and
level of targeting at which any revenues  are spent on the universal transfer N, it is always
possible to increase the degree of targeting a small amount while keeping the tax rate fixed
and maintaining the tax base. It therefore follows  that the only possible NNE is (1, r*  (1)).
In fact, since this policy is politically feasible while satisfying ( 13), it actually must be a
naive Nash equilibrium. Therefore, there is a unique NNE at (1, r*  (1)), where all revenues
are spent on the targeted transfer and none on the universal one.
Turning now to sophisticated policymaking,  we define a sophisticated Nash equilibrium
15(SNE)  as any  policy  (k*, T*(k*))  that  satisfies the  following:
k* = arg  max  S(kT,r*(k)),  (14)
kE[0,1]
The  sophisticated  policymaker  recognizes  that  the  politically  feasible tax  rate  will de-
pend  on the  degree of targeting.  Because the  politically  feasible tax  rate  r* is the  solution
to  middle  income  voters'  first  order  condition,  it  must  vary  continuously  with  the  degree
of targeting  k.12 Existence  of a sophisticated  Nash  equilibrium  is thus  reduced  to  noting
that  a  continuous  function  takes  a  maximum  on  a compact  set.  Any  value  of k at  which
this  maximum  is obtained,  k*, is then  an optimal  choice for the sophisticated  policymaker,
so any  policy  (k*, r*(k*))  is thus  a sophisticated  Nash equilibrium.  Existence  of each kind
of Nash equilibrium  is thus  proved.
3.3  Sophisticated  Nash  equilbrium  and  welfare  properties  of  politically
feasible  policies
In this  subsection,  we demonstrate  that  total  transfers  N + a  are  strictly  decreasing  in the
degree of targeting  on the set of politically feasible policies.  This fact effectively reverses  the
second order  stochastic  dominance  argument  used above, so that  income distributions  with
lower levels of targeting  dominate  those with  higher levels. It  follows that  social welfare  is
also strictly  decreasing  in the degree of targeting,  so that  the  unique naive Nash equilbrium
minimizes  social welfare on the  set of politically  feasible policies.
' 2Actually,  without  assumption  A  1,  this  result  is not  guaranteed.  In  fact,  it  is possible  that  there  is
a single  k at  which  the  majority  voting  equilibrium  r-  both  jumps  up  and  can  have  either  of  two values.
Gelbach  (1997)  offers a full description  of the  majority  voting equilibrium  correspondence.
16We begin  by reformulating  middle  income voters'  optimization  problem  (choosing the
equilibrium  tax  rate)  into one  that  looks  like. a standard  consumer  theory  problem.  This
approach  has the advantage  of making it clear what  "goods" are being traded  off against  one
another.  Define z = N +  9,  so that  z is the amount  of consumption  insurance  purchased  by
a targeting-taxation  policy; hence z is received by all poor  and  unemployed  middle  income
agents.  Next,  from the  definitions  of N  and  9, we have N  + 9  [3  + k(l  - S)]1T/3 and
N + 1 -Tr  =  1 - [1 - y  + kf)]r. Therefore we may write
N + 1 - T  =  1-7r(k)z,  (15)
where  7r(k) is defined  as follows:
(  (  + [1  - S]k)()16
Intuitively,  7r(k) is the price  of insurance  when the  degree of targeting  is k.  Fixing  the
degree of targeting  (and  thus  the price  ir) and  denoting  middle  income agents'  net  income
when employed  as w, we have thus  transformed  the  problem  of maximizing  middle  income
agents'  utility  into the  following one:
max f (z) + g(w)  s.t.  w + 7rz =  1,  (17)
w,z
where  each of f (z)  = pu(z)  + amqqu(z  + p)  and g(w)  =  (1 - am)qu(w)  is strictly  increasing
and  strictly  concave.  Intuitively,  f (z)  is the  expected  utility  received by  a middle  income
voter  from resources  consumed  by a representative  poor agent  as well as the  resources that
the  middle  income agent  herself receives if unemployed.  The  middle income agent  receives
17expected  utility  of g(w) from resources  she will consume if she is employed  (given that  she
will want  to  work in the  formal sector).
The solution  to  the problem  in  ( 17) is given by that  value of z that  solves f'(z)/g'(1  -
irz)  =  it.  We are  interested  in the  effects of changes  in the  degree of targeting  k  on  the
optimal  level of z  satisfying  this  first  order  condition.  The  analogy  to  consumer  theory
ends here,  because  changes  in k have a direct  impact  on z, since z = [S  + (1 - S)k]VT/S.  In
fact,  changes in z have three  effects. First,  by raising  the level of insurance  z, they  increase
income received by recipients  of the targeted  transfer.  As a result,  marginal  utility  of those
agents,  given by f'(z),  must  fall when  k is increased.
Second, increases  in the  degree of targeting  raise the  price  of insurance,  i.e.  7r'(k) > 0.
In  demonstrating  this  fact,  it will be useful  to consider the  percentage  change  in the  price
of insurance  7r for a small  change in the  degree of targeting  k.  That  is, taking  the  natural
log of the  price  7r and  differentiating  it with respect  to the  degree of targeting,  we have
dln7r  y1-d
dk  1-y+ky  b+(1-6)k
The  first  term  on  the  RHS  of (  18) arises  due  to  the  impact  of greater  targeting  on
employed-state  income  for  middle  income  agents:  an  increase  in  targeting  reduces  the
fraction  of the budget  spent  on universal  transfers,  thereby  reducing  employed-state  income
- and  raising  the  price  of unemployed-state  insurance  - accordingly.  On  the  other  hand,
an increase  in the  degree  of targeting  also  means  that  the  share  of tax  revenues going to
nonrecipients  of the  targeted  transfer  - or  the  fraction  (1 - 6) of the  population  - will
be  lower,  meaning  that  the  level of insurance  z  will be  greater  (for fixed  r).  This  effect,
18represented  by the  second  term  on the  RHS of ( 18), tends  to lower middle  income agents'
price  of insurance.
Whether  the price  of insurance  rises or falls depends  on which of these effects is larger.
The  price  will tend  to rise  when we have  either  or both  of a large  tax  base - representing
foregone universal  transfer  revenues - or a large takeup  rate  - representing  relatively  small
increases  in the  size of the  targeted  transfer  for given increases  in the  degree of targeting.
Cross-multiplying  terms  on the  RHS of ( 18) implies that  it will be positive  if and  only  if
1 < y +  ±  (19)
Now, y +a  =  (arr  + qa.)  + (pam + al),  which can be rewritten  as arr + am + ao. Since
r > 1, ( 19) therefore  must be satisfied; therefore  the  price of insurance  is strictly  increasing
in the  degree of targeting.
The  third  effect of an increase  in k is to reduce consumption  of employed middle  income
agents. To see this fact, note that  their consumption is N + 1 - T  =  1 -r[1  - 9  + kg], or
1 - 7rz.  The  expression  involving k  explicitly  is obviously  decreasing  in k,  while  we have
seen that  both  7r and  z are increasing  in k; either  way, it is clear that  middle  income agents'
employed-state  consumption  falls with an increase  in targeting.
Now,  when  the  degree  of targeting  is increased,  all  three  of these  effects make  total
transfers  z  too  high  to  satisfy  the  first  order  condition  for the  consumer  theory  problem
above.  Hence if they  are to maintain  satisfaction  of their  FOC,  middle income voters  must
vote  to reduce  the  tax  rate,  thereby  reducing  total  transfers  z = N  + H.13
"The  total  effect on their  employed-state consumption, N + 1 - r,  cannot generally be signed. On the
19Hence we have established  an important  result:  politically feasible increases in the degree
of targeting  must  reduce total insurance  z = N  + 9.  Moreover, since poor  agents'  utilities
may  be written  entirely  as a strictly  increasing function  of z (i.e.  VI  = pu(z)  + qu(z + P)),
it follows that  poor agents'  utility  is strictly  decreasing  in the  degree of targeting  - "more
for the  poor"  is less for the  poor when political  feasibility  is respected.
Moreover,  by  the  envelope  theorem,  the  only  effect  of an  increase  in  the  degree  of
targeting  k on  middle  income  voters'  utility  is 49Vm/dk; in terms  of the  consumer  theory
analogy,  this  effect  is equivalent  to  [aVm/o9ir][8ir/ok]." 4 Thus  we are left  with  dVm/dk  =
-zg'a7r/ok,  which  is  negative  (since each  of  z,  g',  and  497r/ok is positive).  Therefore,
middle income voters'  utility  also is strictly  decreasing  in the degree of targeting  on the  set
of politically  feasible policies.
As for rich agents,  it is straightforward  to show that  r  >  1 implies that  if total  transfers
one hand, the increase in targeting reduces the budgetary share and hence the size of the targeted  transfer
N.  On the other hand, the induced fall in the tax rate raises the term  N - r.  To see this  fact, note that
assumption A 1 can hold only if y < 1; otherwise middle income voters would always benefit from higher
taxes when there is no targeting (i.e. k = 0) since we would have N - r = ry  - 1]. In this case, both middle
income and poor  voters would always prefer rmk, the maximum tax  rate  for which all employed middle
income and rich agents choose formal sector work, to any lower tax rate,  thereby violating the assumption.
1 4To see this fact, note that
89/rn/Ok  = f'(z)9z/Ok  - [a(irz)/9k]g'(I - xz)
=  if'  - 7rg']Oz/0k  - zg'9ir/9k
But  [f'  - rg']  =  0 by the FOC for an optimum in z, leaving only the term  -zg'0irr/Ok, which is what we
get by applying the envelope theorem to the consumer theory problem.
20N  + 0 are  decreasing  in the  degree of targeting  (as we have just  shown),  then  rich agents'
consumption  N  + r(I  - r)]/dk > 0 must  be increasing  in  the  degree of targeting.' 5 That
is, if increases  in  the  degree  of targeting  reduce  the  amount  of consumption  insurance  z,
then  the  tax  rate  must  fall by enough  to  offset  rich agents'  lower universal  transfers  with
greater  after-tax  labor  income, thus  increasing their  post-policy  income.  Hence rich agents'
own-utility  must  also  be strictly  increasing  in the  degree of targeting.  It  follows that  for
" 5Totally differentiating and rearranging N + H  =  [5  + (1 - S)k]prm(k)/I with respect to k and  noting
that  this derivative must be negative, we have
- 1  d>  _-6  (20)
r,(k)  dk  6 + (1-5)k
Now,  writing  N + r(l  -r,,  (k)) = r - r  (k)[r  - y  + kg], we  may differentiate  this term and rearrange  so
that  N + r(l  - t) is increasing in k iff
1  l(k)  r - _  + kg  (21)
Since ( 20) must hold, if we can show that  its RItS exceeds the RHS of ( 21), then  ( 21) will hold as well.
The derivation works as follows:
5+(1-5)k  r-y+kg
(1 -6)[r-g+kg]  > 9[6  +(1 -6)k]  4*
(1-6)[r-  y]  >y  *
r(l-  3) > y[5  + (1 -5)]  =Y
Thus we require (qgem  + 0r)r > qge +arr,  which must hold since r > 1. Therefore rich agents' income must
be increasing in k.
21any  values of the  other  parameters  of the  model,  there  will exist  some positive  degree  of
altruism  for rich voters,  ar,  such that  their overall  utility  also will be strictly  increasing  in
the  degree of targeting  on the  set of politically  feasible policies.
This  finding  presents  the  politics of targeting  in a stark  light:  since middle  income and
poor  voters'  utility  is strictly  decreasing  in the  degree of targeting  on  the set of politically
feasible policies, if rich voters'  utility  is strictly  increasing then  it follows that  any politically
feasible policy  is Pareto  efficient in the  set of politically  feasible policies.  The  "efficiency"
argument  for  targeting  can  hardly  hold  up  under  such circumstances.  Of  course,  when
labor  disutility  is variable,  so  that  targeting  allows  lower - and  hence  less distortionary
- labor  income  taxes,  this  result  will be less likely to  hold.  However, because  our  results
hold strictly  in the  economy we consider,  there  will always exist some generalization  of this
economy, incorporating  the  desired improvements,  such that  all the results  carry  through.1 6
To sum up the results  of this section,  we have shown that  conventional  wisdom regarding
the  optimality  of targeting  should be stood  on its head.  Where  the  conventional  approach
is to  take  the  budget  as fixed  and  maximize  social  welfare  with  respect  to  the  degree  of
targeting,  we show that  this  procedure  minimizes  social  welfare  in  political  equilibrium.
Where  conventional  wisdom suggests  that  at  least  some targeting  should  be used,  we show
1 6For example,  suppose  that  there  is some additive  disutility  of labor  supply,  v(l; p), where  I is the fraction
of an  agent's  time  spent  working  (so that  middle  income  voters  who  work I receive earnings  of 1, while rich
voters  receive  rl),  and  p  is some  parameter  such  that  v(l; 0) =  0 for all  1. Then  our  results  axe what  one
would  get  by including  labor  disutility  of that  form  but  evaluating  at  p  =  0.  Under  sufficient  continuity
conditions  on  v with  respect  to p,  there  will always exist  a p  >  0 for which  all  of our results  continue  to
hold.
22that  social welfare is maximized in political equilibrium only when all revenues are spent
on universal transfers and none spent on targeted ones. Where conventional wisdom says
that  targeting should benefit the poor, have ambiguous effects on the middle income, and
redistribute from the rich, we show that  targeting redistributes from the poor, makes the
middle income worse off, and benefits the rich in political equilibrium.  It  seems difficult
to  imagine a  more complete reversal of what  admittedly  reasonable, other-things-equal
analysis would suggest at first glance.
4  Summary  and  Extensions
Our main objective in  this  study  has been to assess the welfare properties of targeted
income support  transfers  when a  basic political feasibility condition is imposed on  the
levels of targeting  and  taxation.  In the economy we consider, full targeting would be
optimal if the budget could be taken as fixed.  The intuition here is simple:  when the
budget is fixed, increasing the degree of targeting amounts to reallocating consumption
from rich and employed middle class agents to poor and unemployed agents.  Since this
process contracts the income distribution while maintaining the mean level of income, it
must increase the integral of utilities.
However, when the budget is determined by majority voting, we find that  the equi-
librium tax rate  falls sharply enough that  transfers to poor and unemployed agents are
actually decreasing in  the degree of targeting, while they increase consumption for rich
agents. Thus any increase in the degree of targeting induces a mean-preserving spread of
the income distribution, reducing social welfare.
23The  idea  that  narrowing  the  group  of voters  receiving  a  program's  benefit  might  also
reduce  overall political  support  for that  program  of course is not new, its  possibility  hav-
ing  been  discussed  at  length  over  the  years  among  both  political  scientists  and  political
economists.  Nonetheless,  we  know of no  prior  attempt  to  formalize  the  issue  in  any  co-
herent  way, by  contrast  to the  large  economic literature  - both  theoretical  and  empirical  -
that  considers  targeting  while ignoring politically-driven  budgetary  endogeneity.
The  economy we consider is admittedly  very simple, even beyond  the  assumption  that
the  formal  sector  work constraints  are  always satisfied.  In particular,  it would be  nice to
allow  the  tax  base  to  vary  continuously  with  the  tax  rate,  as  in standard  labor  supply
models.  Unfortunately,  such  an  approach  adds  an unmanageable  degree  of complexity  to
the various  components  of a modelling endeavor like this  one.  Nonetheless,  our results  hold
strictly  in the  economy we consider.  Therefore,  there  will always exist  some generalization
of this  economy,  incorporating  the  desired  improvements,  such  that  all  results  endure.
Moreover,  the  benefit  of treating  such a  simple  case  is large:  our  results  do  not  depend
on  the  structure  of individual  preferences,  holding  for  all  increasing  and  concave  utility
functions,  while  also  allowing  large  degrees  of altruism  for both  middle  income  and  rich
voters.
Lastly, our results suggest  important  implications  for how economists  should think about
private  insurance  markets.  In  particular,  if social  insurance  is an  important  motive  for
politically  determined  redistributive  taxation,  then  it seems possible that  thicker  insurance
markets  could reduce social welfare.  As middle class voters become more able to diversify in
private  markets,  they  may no longer see their welfare as dependent  on social insurance  and
24reduce  their  political support  for it as a result.  Also, to the extent  that  programs  like Social
Security  and  Medicare  perform  both  redistributive  and  insurance  functions,  privatization
plans  that  separate  these  roles  might  well reduce  poltical  support  for  the  redistributive
component,  possibly  lowering social welfare.
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T.a(k)  Maximum  tax  for which all  middle class amid  rich workers choose
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